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FINAL REPORT

of the **State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation**

of 3 September 2025

regarding the **serious aviation incident**

2022/1738

OCCURRENCE NUMBER

1. Polish Air Navigation Services Agency
2. Embraer – ERJ190-200, SP-LNF
3. Airbus – A320-214, D-AIZJ

18 April 2022, CTR/TMA airport EPKK

ATM: ATM/CNS

MAC: AIRPROX/dangerous proximity/mid-air collision

OTHER: Other

This Report was issued by the State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation on the basis of information available on the date of its issue.

This Report presents the circumstances of the aviation occurrence concerned, as well as its causes, contributing factors and safety recommendations, if issued.



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1. Course of the events

On 18 April 2022, during an RNP approach to land on RWY 07 at EPKK, an Embraer 190-type aircraft, registration number SP-LNF (hereinafter: A/C 1) had a missed approach. Approximately 10 seconds earlier, an Airbus A320 aircraft, registration number D-AIZJ (hereafter: A/C 2), took off in the same direction. After receiving information about A/C 1's go-around, TWR KK controller instructed the A/C 2 crew to continue straight ahead, and the A/C 1 crew to turn immediately left, north. At this point, the separation between A/C 1 and A/C 2 was 1.3 NM horizontally and 300 ft vertically.

After separation between the two aircraft was increased to approximately 1.5 NM and 400 ft on diverging courses, TWR KK controller transferred communications with A/C 1 and A/C 2 to APP KK. A/C 1 landed at EPKK airport without repercussions. A/C 2 continued its flight to the destination airport.




Fig. 1. Position of SP1 after commencing left turn, north, and SP2 flying headed RWY 07.
[Source: Incident investigator - PANSA].

2. Relevant information

The DIR KK controller radar-guided A/C 1 to a straight-in approach to RWY 07 at a distance of approximately 11.5 NM, at an altitude of 4,000 ft. They did not apply speed control to A/C 1. At approximately 7.5 NM in their straight-in approach, the A/C 1 crew maintained a speed of 209 kt instead of the required 160 kt. Analysis of the radar indicator shows that the approaching A/C 1 crossed the approach line thrice before stabilising on the runway heading at a distance of approximately 3 NM from the threshold, while maintaining an altitude of 2,400 ft ALT instead of 1,800 ft ALT (1,000 ft AGL).

When A/C 1 was at a distance of approximately 2.5 NM in its straight-in approach, the TWR KK controller cleared the SP2 crew to take off from RWY 07. After A/C 2 lifted off, the TWR controller issued a landing clearance to the A/C 1 crew, located approximately 0.5 NM from the runway threshold. However, four seconds later, the A/C 1 crew considered the approach to be unstable (with speed exceeding 160 kt), and made the decision to go around.

3. Conclusions

The landing clearance given to the A/C 1 crew was issued under conditions of insufficient separation from A/C 2, which was taking off from the same runway.

3.1. Findings

The TWR KK controller planned A/C 2's s take-off before A/C 1's landing, and informed the DIR controller of this. The DIR controller did not apply speed control to A/C 1 before transferring communications to TWR KK, and the TWR KK controller did not ensure separation between A/C 2 which was taking off and A/C 1 which was landing.

3.2. Causes and contributing factors

The immediate cause of the occurrence was the lack of a pre-emptive decision by the TWR KK controller to revoke the previously issued landing clearance for A/C 1 and to issue a go-around instruction, despite the observed high approach speed and the limited ability to provide the required separation.

The DIR KK controller failed to apply speed control to the approaching A/C 1.

4. Safety Recommendations

None proposed.
